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I
t is budget season in Canada, when Ottawa and all provincial and territorial
governments unveil their budget plans for the coming fiscal year. Budget
commitments are widely reported, and subject to votes of confidence in
legislatures. This attention is apt: fiscal policy is a powerful economic tool
and, in the long run, the amount governments spend on their programs
determines how much tax Canadians pay and what public debts they carry.
Before treating these documents seriously as statements about their fiscal
futures, however, Canadians should ask how reliable their governments’ budget
commitments have been in the past. After all, the less reliable those commitments
have been, the less confidence Canadians can have that governments will stick to
them in the future — thus weakening a key link in the process of accountability to
voters.
To examine this accountability issue, we look at 10 years of federal and
provincial/territorial budget projections and results, and compare them using two
measures of reliability:
￿ bias – whether deviations between results and projections have tended
toward a particular direction; and
￿ accuracy – how small have been the deviations between results and
projections.
To preview the most salient conclusions, we find that, over the past decade, all
governments tended to spend more than they projected at budget time. Quebec,
Newfoundland, New Brunswick and the federal government have the best records
on this front, with average overruns of less than 2 percent. The worst records
belong to Alberta, the Yukon and Nunavut, with average overruns of 4.8, 7.7 and
9.2 percent, respectively. 
The rankings based on accuracy are similar, but not identical. Quebec, New
Brunswick, and Ontario had the best performances, with average deviations of
less than 3 percent. Again, Alberta, the Yukon and Nunavut performed the worst,
with average deviations of 5.8, 9.0 and 10.8 percent, respectively.  Although
Ottawa performed well on the bias measure, its score on accuracy is only middle-
of-the-pack. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, budgets in most Canadian governments show a
positive correlation between surprises on the revenue side and surprises on the
spending side — that is, actual spending tends to be higher than expected at
budget time in years when revenue is higher than expected, and vice versa.
Apparently, many governments find it convenient to spend unforeseen revenues
by voting unbudgeted spending during the fiscal year.
It is important that governments respect their budget commitments. Critically,
the period in the run-up to each fiscal year is the only time when Parliament and
provincial/territorial legislatures weigh all competing demands on the public
sector and establish priorities. Revenue and spending measures later during the
We thank Judith Beaumont, Yvonne Ingram, and Paul Reddy for help with data. David Laidler,
Finn Poschmann and a number of other reviewers provided helpful comments and suggestions.
Robin Banerjee made a significant contribution to this revised version.  Responsibility for
conclusions and any remaining errors rests with us.budget year — especially spending supplements voted when the funds are already
effectively or actually spent — do not get the same scrutiny or prompt the same
questions about alternatives. And, as recent unplanned surpluses at the federal
level and spending overruns in several provinces have highlighted, large recurring
differences between budgets and outcomes may induce skepticism among
policymakers and the public, undermining confidence in the budget process itself.
Another key concern is that, as governments have become larger and more
complicated, the ability of legislators to understand and control revenues and
spending is increasingly under stress. In addition, legislators effectively control
less and less of their budgets as formula- and demand-driven programs — such as
income support and health care — grow relative to other programs. This
environment, we believe, may erode the accountability of the executive to
legislators for budget outcomes and the accountability of legislators to their
constituents. Such a development would be ominous, given Canada’s need to
devote resources to private sector investment and to contain public sector
commitments as population growth slows and Canadians get older.
Unexpected claims on spending arise from time to time as a result of natural
disasters, war, and many other causes. By looking at a number of years together,
however, we can highlight situations where large discrepancies — overruns, in
particular — threaten to become routine, depriving voters and taxpayers of the
ability to enforce their judgments at the ballot box. Using such measures of fiscal
outcomes, it may be possible to encourage governments to honour their budget
commitments, and thus increase Canadians’ control over their fiscal futures.
Measuring Fiscal Results against Budget Commitments
In the wake of the fiscal difficulties many Canadian governments encountered in
the mid-1990s, evaluations of fiscal performance tend to focus on budget balances
— comparing deficits or surpluses with government projections or with the
predictions of nongovernment forecasters. Because a budget balance is the
difference between two large numbers, however, its size and even its direction are
sensitive to relatively small differences in revenues or expenditures. For that
reason, we focus on revenue and spending separately.
Furthermore, in comparing the relative performance of governments, we are
mainly concerned with spending, rather than with revenue. The reason is that —
although one cannot rule out the possibility that governments deliberately shade
their revenue projections one way or another — it is not a straightforward exercise
to compare discrepancies in projected and actual revenues from one government
to the next. Governments that are more dependent on cyclical revenue sources,
such as those from natural resources, will naturally have a tougher time
anticipating their incomes. The importance of federal transfers for provincial and
territorial governments adds a further important uncertainty — particularly in the
case of equalization payments, which are subject to retroactive adjustments — so
different exposure to this source of uncertainty also makes comparisons of
governments difficult. Program spending, by contrast, is something that legislators
vote on in dollar terms. Notwithstanding the influence of economic and other
factors that are difficult for legislators to control, all legislatures vote dollar
2 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounderamounts. Even in a world full of surprises, voters are entitled to expect those votes
to mean something.
We should also note that we focus on announced and actual changes in
spending. Specifically, we first determine the “announced spending change“ by
taking the difference between the total spending announced in each budget for the
upcoming fiscal year and the spending shown in that new budget for the fiscal
year that is about to end or has just ended. To calculate the “actual spending
change“ we turn to the public accounts. We take the difference between the
spending amount published in the public accounts at the end of the fiscal year and
the equivalent number for the previous fiscal year.
1 Directly comparing spending
levels would be simpler, but some governments — Ottawa, most notably — did
not use consistent reporting methods in their budget and public accounts numbers
over the past decade.
2 Focusing on changes, rather than levels, reduces the
sensitivity of our results to distortions created by such inconsistency. Finally, to
compare governments with greatly varying sizes of budgets, we use percentage
changes for our comparisons.
3
Table 1 presents projected and actual spending changes since fiscal year
1996/97 for Ottawa and all the provinces and territories. The top panel shows the
difference between the upcoming fiscal year and its predecessor, as presented in
each budget. The middle panel shows the difference between the same fiscal year
and its predecessor, as presented in the public accounts after the end of the year.
The bottom panel shows how close the actual change was to the change
anticipated in the budget — a quick glance reveals that all governments had
problems making their spending come in as projected, but, as a couple of
summary measures show, some met this challenge better than others.
To summarize the reliability of government budget performance over the past
decade, we measured both the bias and accuracy of government forecasts, in the
following way:
￿ Bias is the tendency, if any, of a forecast to err consistently in one direction.
For our measure, we chose the mean error — the arithmetic average of the
annual errors. This simple and widely used measure of forecast bias is a
simple average, in which underestimates and overestimates offset each
other. As a result, the mean error measures only one dimension of the
quality of a forecast — a small mean error could result either if all the
errors were small or if all the errors were large but the overestimates and
underestimates happened to balance each other out.
￿ Accuracy is the closeness of a forecast’s values to actual outcomes.
Measures of accuracy more clearly reflect the usual meaning of forecast
C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 3
1  Where there is ambiguity about which spending total to use, we adopt the totals reported in the
Fiscal Reference Tables published by the federal Department of Finance (see
www.fin.gc.ca/purl/frt-e.html) following the relevant year.
2 Ottawa, for example, used to net some spending programs, such as the Child Benefit, against
revenue in its budget presentations, making the figures for both revenue and spending in
budgets considerably lower than the gross figures in the public accounts.
3 We calculate the percent changes by dividing the dollar discrepancy between the budget forecasts
and the public-accounts outcomes by the previous year's level as shown in the budget.4 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
Table 1:  Expenditure Forecasts
Announced Spending Change (%)
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. NWT YK Nunavut
1996-97 -2.49 -2.32 1.35 -5.59 3.04 -3.31 -4.79 -3.80 -4.40 -1.63 2.28 -6.76
1997-98 -1.75 -2.72 -3.86 -0.24 -1.51 -0.61 -4.03 -1.34 -1.24 1.24 -0.64 -4.11
1998-99 0.34 0.41 -2.21 -0.50 -0.47 1.75 -0.61 -2.76 1.99 0.47 0.77 -7.39
1999-00 0.13 -1.02 -0.29 4.57 2.06 -1.20 2.94 5.66 -0.33 2.16 1.33 -3.63
2000-01 0.64 3.11 1.51 -0.61 -2.25 2.75 -1.23 -0.62 3.63 1.78 -1.30 4.84 -1.88 3.20
2001-02 5.14 5.35 -0.22 0.51 6.60 3.40 2.15 1.72 5.85 12.48 7.43 4.47 -1.12 1.79
2002-03 3.35 1.45 1.31 0.89 4.43 2.02 3.47 2.20 -0.77 -8.05 -0.32 5.08 -4.42 1.96
2003-04 2.79 5.53 4.69 3.78 4.31 4.26 7.07 4.15 3.41 0.21 -2.37 5.68 -6.85 3.20
2004-05 2.29 0.42 -3.64 4.94 2.29 3.09 6.88 1.10 0.90 2.90 -2.59 4.49 5.14 -6.51
2005-06 1.87 5.48 1.41 4.15 3.73 3.34 4.18 3.50 1.14 5.68 4.74 1.51 5.04 -2.30
2006-07 5.03 10.11 2.62 6.25 1.74 4.10 2.08 3.39 0.13 3.99 3.68 0.84 -3.10 2.59
Actual Spending Change (%)
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. NWT YK Nunavut
1996-97 -5.81 -1.12 2.71 -4.00 -0.43 -3.85 -3.37 -1.76 -0.34 -1.27 2.00 2.37
1997-98 0.12 8.49 -0.77 4.36 0.91 1.04 0.17 5.26 0.61 6.06 -0.52 -4.45
1998-99 3.79 -4.98 6.00 11.42 5.47 5.91 2.28 3.41 8.73 4.25 1.08 0.84
1999-00 0.74 0.72 6.78 6.05 3.83 1.86 7.10 9.80 3.56 10.00 7.77 9.05
2000-01 5.98 4.66 6.27 -3.05 -2.25 4.88 -0.50 2.76 2.55 9.47 1.11 5.63 3.51 14.86
2001-02 2.08 5.58 1.98 8.34 7.35 3.18 2.97 1.85 7.00 9.88 12.34 9.23 6.28 16.48
2002-03 4.02 1.47 1.14 -1.97 4.22 -0.76 8.42 3.04 0.57 -1.52 -0.07 6.05 0.68 4.29
2003-04 3.53 5.14 10.50 8.18 5.40 2.10 7.75 7.12 6.15 5.89 -2.05 5.56 11.51 4.90
2004-05 11.48 0.81 3.71 6.30 2.35 4.86 7.40 2.64 3.87 10.91 1.04 6.63 11.46 10.33
2005-06 -0.78 4.86 0.27 7.24 5.78 2.39 5.65 7.26 9.21 11.61 7.16 6.86 9.24 5.53
2006-07
Difference (%)
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB Que. ON Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. NWT YK Nunavut
1996-97 -3.32 1.21 1.36 1.59 -3.46 -0.54 1.42 2.03 4.06 0.35 -0.28 9.13
1997-98 1.86 11.21 3.09 4.60 2.42 1.65 4.21 6.60 1.85 4.82 0.11 -0.34
1998-99 3.45 -5.40 8.21 11.92 5.95 4.15 2.88 6.17 6.74 3.78 0.31 8.23
1999-00 0.61 1.74 7.07 1.48 1.78 3.06 4.16 4.14 3.89 7.83 6.43 12.68
2000-01 5.35 1.55 4.77 -2.44 0.00 2.13 0.73 3.39 -1.08 7.68 2.41 0.79 5.39 11.66
2001-02 -3.06 0.22 2.20 7.82 0.75 -0.22 0.82 0.14 1.16 -2.60 4.91 4.76 7.40 14.69
2002-03 0.67 0.01 -0.18 -2.86 -0.20 -2.78 4.95 0.84 1.33 6.54 0.24 0.97 5.09 2.33
2003-04 0.74 -0.39 5.80 4.39 1.09 -2.16 0.68 2.97 2.75 5.68 0.32 -0.11 18.36 1.69
2004-05 9.19 0.39 7.34 1.36 0.06 1.77 0.52 1.54 2.97 8.01 3.63 2.14 6.31 16.84
2005-06 -2.64 -0.62 -1.14 3.09 2.05 -0.96 1.47 3.76 8.07 5.94 2.42 5.35 4.20 7.83
2006-07
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents, public accounts, fiscal reference tables (federal department of finance), authors’
calculations.“quality“ than does the mean error because overestimates and
underestimates do not offset each other. Our preferred measure for
accuracy is the root mean square error — the square root of the average of the
squared forecast errors. This measure shows the size of the error without
regard to whether it is positive or negative, and gives greater weight to
larger errors, which seems reasonable given the disproportionate damage
to accountability when budget projections and actual results differ greatly
from each other.
Table 2 summarizes the performance of Ottawa, the provinces, and territories in
terms of the bias and accuracy of their budget spending projections and outcomes.
Quebec scores best, in terms of both bias and accuracy.
4 New Brunswick, Ontario,
and British Columbia also score relatively well on both measures.
For the sake of a more complete picture, we also present analogous figures for
the revenue side of the budget (Tables 3 and 4) — although, because of the
differences in the degree of exposure to factors such as resource prices and
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Table 2:  Bias and Accuracy in Budget Forecasts of Changes in Spending, 1996/97 to 2005/06
Change in Expenditure Forecast (%)
Jurisdiction





Federal 1.28 4 3.96 7 20,787
Newfoundland 0.99 2 4.03 8 346
Prince Edward Island 3.85 11 4.95 10 346
Nova Scotia 3.09 8 5.24 11 1,500
New Brunswick 1.04 3 2.50 2 524
Quebec 0.61 1 2.25 1 2,381
Ontario 2.18 6 2.72 3 13,366
Manitoba 3.16 9 3.75 6 1,946
Saskatchewan 3.17 10 4.08 9 1,906
Alberta 4.80 12 5.82 12 9,116
British Columbia 2.05 5 3.01 4 5,050
Northwest Territories
1 2.32 7 3.09 5 122
Yukon 7.65 13 9.04 13 425
Nunavut
1 9.17 14 10.84 14 430
1 Starting in fiscal year 2000/01.
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents, public accounts, fiscal reference tables (federal department
of finance), authors’ calculations.
4 Guillemette and Robson (2006), using similar methodology in comparing just Ontario and
Quebec, also establish Quebec as the best performer. However, given the ongoing reservations of
Quebec's auditor-general about the province’s exclusion of large parts of its health and education
sectors from its fiscal reporting framework, it is worth stressing that we focus explicitly here on
measures reported to the legislature in budgets and through the public accounts. Differences
among the provinces in what their financial statements cover may affect the rankings if spending
in excluded sectors is notably easier (as with capital spending) or harder (as with health care) to
control; this question needs further investigation.6 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
Table 3:  Revenue Forecasts
Announced Revenue Change (%)
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB Que. ON Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. NWT YK Nunavut
1996-97 3.37 -2.85 1.39 -1.49 3.37 -1.84 -2.42 -5.46 2.44 -4.58 2.63 -11.51
1997-98 1.70 -1.61 -5.15 -0.26 -2.63 2.14 -1.51 -0.48 -7.45 -11.88 0.39 -2.96
1998-99 2.37 1.60 -1.50 -1.31 -0.17 4.28 2.46 -3.06 3.63 -11.29 1.14 -3.71
1999-00 0.13 -1.23 -2.88 1.59 -0.18 -1.20 6.00 5.42 -0.51 1.56 -0.34 -7.38
2000-01 1.25 3.93 -1.66 0.23 1.89 2.75 -0.66 1.28 9.82 -1.65 0.54 4.89 1.68 3.13
2001-02 -4.09 5.72 0.65 1.80 -1.50 0.46 -1.01 0.57 -11.07 -10.71 2.31 1.61 0.91 5.46
2002-03 0.35 0.72 -0.39 3.09 4.44 2.02 4.85 0.60 2.29 -5.56 -3.57 -13.10 -2.36 -2.55
2003-04 3.36 1.82 4.58 3.78 4.40 4.26 7.79 4.64 -2.76 -2.87 4.10 10.34 1.14 10.43
2004-05 3.37 -3.81 3.07 4.16 4.58 3.13 14.81 4.01 1.79 -9.42 3.19 5.72 2.11 2.67
2005-06 2.34 3.52 3.14 4.39 2.87 3.27 5.90 -0.33 -9.17 -4.89 1.07 1.93 4.96 5.42
2006-07 2.82 0.02 3.10 5.13 0.13 4.42 2.13 3.42 -3.48 -6.34 -0.34 2.03 1.21 2.47
Actual Revenue Change (%)
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB QC ON Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. NWT YK Nunavut
1996-97 7.95 -1.92 1.39 0.59 1.00 -2.33 -0.05 -0.32 7.11 8.13 2.09 -5.51
1997-98 8.77 8.93 -1.50 4.87 -0.25 4.17 6.24 4.47 -6.22 6.29 0.38 -1.30
1998-99 2.16 -4.71 8.09 4.26 0.61 11.88 6.27 2.42 8.56 -5.45 0.45 6.61
1999-00 6.74 -0.03 5.63 0.40 7.59 1.64 13.02 7.98 4.53 19.76 7.61 -0.40
2000-01 8.96 4.63 5.75 8.82 1.34 7.75 2.80 6.54 15.43 28.00 10.38 23.87 14.58 13.24
2001-02 -3.29 5.07 2.30 4.58 6.44 -1.44 -1.23 -0.07 -10.23 -14.06 -3.70 9.33 -4.12 5.98
2002-03 3.78 1.76 -2.06 -6.12 -0.71 -1.02 7.89 3.23 6.68 3.48 -4.90 -10.46 2.95 6.93
2003-04 4.65 2.77 6.82 9.18 5.64 2.78 -0.74 4.08 1.58 14.29 3.92 2.20 15.13 4.80
2004-05 7.24 2.07 9.48 8.36 8.54 4.52 13.83 11.44 19.06 13.58 14.15 12.84 10.56 9.14
2005-06 5.24 18.90 0.47 7.99 5.74 3.44 8.28 2.49 5.52 21.98 7.90 9.95 12.11 7.37
2006-07
Difference (%)
Federal Nfld. P.E.I. NS NB Que. ON Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. NWT YK Nunavut
1996-97 4.58 0.93 0.00 2.08 -2.37 -0.49 2.38 5.14 4.67 12.71 -0.54 6.00
1997-98 7.08 10.54 3.66 5.13 2.38 2.03 7.75 4.95 1.23 18.17 -0.01 1.66
1998-99 -0.22 -6.32 9.60 5.57 0.78 7.60 3.82 5.49 4.93 5.84 -0.70 10.32
1999-00 6.61 1.20 8.51 -1.20 7.76 2.84 7.03 2.56 5.04 18.20 7.96 6.97
2000-01 7.71 0.70 7.40 8.59 -0.55 5.00 3.46 5.26 5.62 29.64 9.84 18.98 12.91 10.11
2001-02 0.79 -0.65 1.66 2.78 7.93 -1.89 -0.21 -0.64 0.84 -3.35 -6.00 7.72 -5.04 0.52
2002-03 3.44 1.04 -1.67 -9.21 -5.14 -3.04 3.03 2.63 4.39 9.04 -1.33 2.64 5.31 9.48
2003-04 1.30 0.95 2.24 5.40 1.23 -1.48 -8.53 -0.56 4.33 17.15 -0.18 -8.14 13.99 -5.62
2004-05 3.87 5.88 6.41 4.20 3.96 1.39 -0.98 7.43 17.27 23.00 10.96 7.12 8.45 6.47
2005-06 2.90 15.37 -2.68 3.61 2.88 0.17 2.38 2.82 14.69 26.87 6.83 8.02 7.15 1.95
2006-07
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents, public accounts, fiscal reference tables (federal department of finance), authors’
calculations.transfers among the various governments, rankings on the revenue side are not as
useful as those on the spending side. Nevertheless, we can make a couple of
observations. First, all governments tended to underestimate revenue growth on
average — likely a consequence of Canada’s generally good economic
performance over the decade. Ottawa’s greater exposure to relatively cyclical
revenues from corporate income tax might account for some of its poor showing
on the bias ranking. However, these numbers — and the colossal unbudgeted
$60.3 billion cumulative increase in federal revenue over the period — are
consistent with suspicions about the conservative nature of Ottawa’s revenue
forecasts over much of the decade. Not surprisingly, those provinces and
territories for which resource revenues and transfers are important also scored
relatively poorly on both bias and accuracy.
Alberta’s poor performance in meeting both its revenue and spending targets
reflects the province’s widely fluctuating revenues over the past 10 years,
combined with unanticipated robust spending growth in several years.
Interestingly, Alberta’s poor performance does not reflect an unusual tendency to
spend revenue surprises in the year they occur. When we calculate the coefficient
of correlation between annual revenue surprises and spending surprises for all
jurisdictions, Alberta, with a coefficient of correlation of 0.3, does not stand out —
rather, it is Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec that
stand out, each with a coefficient of correlation between 0.7 and 0.8. Quebec’s
exemplary bias and accuracy scores tell us that its spending of surprise revenues
C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 7
Table 4:  Bias and Accuracy in Budget Forecasts of Changes in Revenue, 1996/97 to 2005/06
Change in Revenue Forecast
Jurisdiction





Federal 3.81 9 4.60 4 60,300
Newfoundland 2.96 6 6.54 9 1,208
Prince Edward Island 3.51 8 5.40 7 302
Nova Scotia 2.70 5 5.38 6 1,304
New Brunswick 1.89 2 4.33 3 968
Quebec 1.21 1 3.35 1 4,838
Ontario 2.01 3 4.80 5 10,236
Manitoba 3.51 7 4.31 2 2,225
Saskatchewan 6.30 12 8.11 11 4,021
Alberta 15.73 14 18.37 14 32,984
British Columbia 2.68 4 6.05 8 7,135
Northwest Territories
1 6.06 11 10.07 13 304
Yukon 6.77 13 8.56 12 364
Nunavut
1 3.82 10 6.70 10 171
1 Starting in fiscal year 2000/01.
Sources:  Federal/provincial/territorial budget documents, fiscal reference tables (federal department of finance), public
accounts, authors’ calculations.had limited impacts, while in the other two provinces the rush to spend
unforeseen revenues fostered larger overruns.
Closing Observations
Our comparison of federal, provincial, and territorial budget-making bias and
accuracy leads us to make recommendations of both a technical and a political
nature.
On a technical level, the budget-making processes of more successful
governments — Quebec above all — should be the object of study by the federal
and other governments to see what lessons they might draw for their own budget
processes. To the extent that governments have become more exposed to
circumstances beyond their control, legislators should insist on new forecasting
tools — for instance, budget forecasts that provide a range of possibilities for key
outcomes, rather than point estimates — that would enable them to make more
informed judgments about prudent levels of spending in the face of uncertainty.
5
On a political level, legislators and citizens alike should insist that their
governments exercise better discipline in hitting spending targets. They should
also recognize that practices such as the “end-of-March burnoff“ — the rush to
spend at, or even after, the end of the fiscal year — have lasting, negative effects
on the taxes they pay and the public debts they must support. We find that the
direction of errors in spending is remarkably consistent across the country —
overruns are much more common than shortfalls. Moreover, over time, average
overruns have been large enough that government spending has grown
considerably faster than legislators promised. It is one thing for high levels of
taxes or deficits to exist as a result of commitments made and debated at budget
time. It is quite another to get them because of overruns during or, worse, right at
the end of the fiscal year.
Readers inclined to think that this evidence shows that inducing governments
to stick to their commitments is a hopeless task should, we think, draw comfort
from the fact of different levels of overruns from place to place. These suggest that
tolerance for them among legislators — and presumably among citizens as well —
is not the same everywhere. We hope our exploration of how governments
perform in meeting their budget commitments will prompt both legislators and
citizens to hold their governments more accountable, and reduce both bias and
forecast errors in budgets to come.
8 C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder
5 For an elaboration of this idea in the federal context, see Robson (2006).
References
Guillemette, Yvan, and William B.P. Robson. 2006. “A Tale of Two Provinces: Spending Overruns in
Ontario and Quebec Spell Fiscal Trouble.“ C.D. Howe Institute e-brief 27. Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute. May.
Robson, William B.P. 2006. Beating the Odds: A New Framework for Prudent Federal Budgeting. C.D.
Howe Institute Commentary 230. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. March.Recent C.D. Howe Institute Publications
February 2007 Finnie, Ross and Alex Usher. Room at the Top: Strategies for Increasing the Number of Graduate
Students in Canada. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 245.
February 2007 Hurwitz, Stephen A. and Louis J. Marett. Financing Canadian Innovation: Why Canada Should
End Roadblocks to Foreign Private Equity. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 244.
February 2007 Iacobucci, Edward M., Michael J. Trebilcock and Tracey D. Epps. Rerouting the Mail: Why
Canada Post is Due for Reform. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 243.
February 2007 Cherniavsky, Ben and Benjamin Dachis. Excess Baggage: Measuring Air Transportation’s Fiscal
Burden. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 242.
January 2007 Payne, A. Abigail and Huizi Zhao. “Uncharitable Treatment? Why Donations to Private and
Public Foundations Deserve Equal Tax Status.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
December 2006 Guillemette, Yvan et William Robson. “Un tendre assassin : l’adoption du projet de loi n° 30
met en péril l’avenir des régimes de retraite à prestations déterminées au Québec.” C.D.
Howe Institute e-brief.
December 2006 Kitchen, Harry. A State of Disrepair: How to Fix the Financing of Municipal Infrastructure in
Canada. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 241.
December 2006 Chant, John. “The Passport Package: Rethinking the Citizenship Benefits of Non-Resident
Canadians.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 99.
November 2006 Gray, David M. “Has EI Reform Unraveled? Canada’s EI Regime in the 2000s.” C.D. Howe
Institute Backgrounder 98.
November 2006 Daniels, Mark R. “Insurers and Banks: Levelling the Regulatory Playing Field.” C.D. Howe
Institute Backgrounder 97.
October 2006 Robson, William B.P. “Time and Money: Tracking the Fiscal Impact of Demographic Change
in Canada.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
October 2006 Laidler, David. “2 Percent Forever? Inflation Targets Need Fresh Scrutiny.” C.D. Howe
Institute e-brief.
October 2006 McKenzie, Kenneth J. Giving with One Hand, Taking Away with the Other: Canada’s Tax System
and Research and Development. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 240.
September 2006 Mintz, Jack M. The 2006 Tax Competitiveness Report: Proposals for Pro-Growth Tax Reform. C.D.
Howe Institute Commentary 239.
September 2006 Guillemette, Yvan and William Robson. “No Elixir of Youth: Immigration Cannot Keep
Canada Young.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 96.
September 2006 Laidler, David. Grasping the Nettles: Clearing the Path to Financial Services Reform in Canada. C.D.
Howe Institute Commentary 238.
September 2006 Poschmann, Finn. “Recalibrating the Federal Balance: Federal-Provincial Fiscal Priorities for
2006 and Beyond.” C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder 95.
August 2006 Richards, John, and Mathew Brzozowski. Let’s Walk before We Run: Cautionary Advice on
Childcare. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 237.
Août 2006 Richards, John, and Mathew Brzozowski. Marchons avant de courir: Une mise en garde à propos
des services de garderie. C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 237.
July 2006 Guillemette, Yvan. “Wasting Talent: The Risising Dispersion of Unemployment Rates in
Canada.” C.D. Howe Institute e-brief.
July 2006 Goldfarb, Danielle. Too Many Eggs in One Basket? Evaluating Canada’s Need to Diversify Trade.
C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 236.